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Abstract
We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial
venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s op-
erations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and
quite diﬀerent from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In
particular, our framework generates a rationale for ﬁrm decline. As young ﬁrms
accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur
(inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter continues
to grow, invested capital and ﬁrm value start declining and so does the value of
outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier
the entrepreneur (the greater is inside equity). In turn, this leads to a decline in
the constrained–eﬃcient level of eﬀort and therefore to a drop in the return to
investment.
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Think of an investor who provides seed ﬁnancing to an entrepreneurial ﬁrm. The
success of her investment will depend crucially on the eﬀort that the entrepreneur
puts in. Yet, the incentives of the two individuals are not perfectly aligned, as the
entrepreneur bears the whole cost of such eﬀort while sharing the pecuniary returns
with the investor. Since monitoring the entrepreneur’s conduct is prohibitively ex-
pensive, the investor will ﬁnd it optimal to implement an incentive scheme that links
rewards to observables. We are interested in characterizing the implications of such
scheme for the dynamics of ﬁrm size and value, as well as the latter’ split between
the two agents.
The problem just described can be conveniently cast as a model of repeated bilat-
eral exchange with hidden action along the lines of Spear and Srivastava (1987) and
Wang (1997). The only caveat is that in their models there is no notion of important
features of ﬁrm dynamics such as production and capital accumulation. The purpose
of this paper is to explicitly model both of these. We do so by assuming that the
entrepreneur is equipped with a production function that exhibits decreasing returns
and is hit by multiplicative shocks whose probability distribution depends in a natural
way on managerial eﬀort.
The incentive scheme chosen by the investor belongs to the set of constrained–
eﬃcient allocations, which in turn consist of sequences of eﬀort provision, payouts,
and investment, that maximize the value of the investor’s claim (outside equity) for
given rewards to the entrepreneur.
The main insight generated by our analysis is a rationale for ﬁrm decline, which
follows from the negative relation between the marginal value of investment and
the entrepreneur’s continuation utility. Since the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ function is
additively separable in consumption and eﬀort and displays constant relative risk
aversion to consumption bets, incentive provision is costlier, the greater the value
assigned to the entrepreneur by the constrained–eﬃcient contract.1 Everything else
equal, this means that the higher the entrepreneur’s continuation value, the lower the
constrained–eﬃcient level of eﬀort provision. By reducing the likelihood of a high
productivity shock, this results in a lower marginal value of investment.
A lending contract assigns to the entrepreneur a level of capital and a claim to
1This is a well–known property, exploited by Spear and Wang (2005) and Wang (2006) to model
the optimal termination of employment contracts and by Newman (2007) to study the relationship
between wealth and occupational choice.
1future cash ﬂows. For consistency with the empirical evidence on the relative size of
entrant ﬁrms, assume that the initial capital is small (in a sense to be made precise
later). Then, the typical ﬁrm dynamics predicted by our model is as follows. Given
decreasing returns, early on the marginal product of capital is high. Since further
infusions of capital from the investor are ruled out by assumption, ﬁrm size gradually
increases over time, thanks to the investment of retained earnings. Optimal incentive
provision dictates that on average the entrepreneur’s continuation value and her claim
to future cash ﬂows (inside equity) increase as well. These forces have countervailing
eﬀects on the marginal value of managerial eﬀort, positive for capital and negative
for continuation value. Eventually, the latter dominates. Capital and eﬀort start
declining, and so does ﬁrm value.
When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater than one and agents
discount future utility at the same rate, in the limit all cash ﬂows accrue to the
entrepreneur. Firm size, eﬀort, and inside equity converge to a constant. When the
entrepreneur is either relatively more impatient or her EIS is smaller than 1, the
model allows for non–degenerate stationary distributions of ﬁrm size, ﬁrm value, and
its split between the two agents.
We ﬁnd that the qualitative features of ﬁrm dynamics we have just described
survive the generalization to the scenario in which productivity shocks are persistent.
This paper contributes to a fast–growing literature that explores the implica-
tions of moral hazard for ﬁrm dynamics. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and
Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004) consider scenarios where the entrepreneur has
limited commitment, while Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), Brusco and Ropero (2007),
Quadrini (2003) and DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2008) study the case of hid-
den information. All of these models, as well as other theories of ﬁrm dynamics such
as Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992), are able to rationalize the negative cor-
relation between age and the exit hazard rate that was documented for relatively
young ﬁrms. None of them, however, is consistent with the evidence, provided by
Aggarwal and Gort (1996, 2002), that for older ﬁrms the exit hazard rate increases
with age, irrespective of the industry life–cycle phase.
This caveat does not apply to our theory. For every cohort of ﬁrms whose dynamics
are described by our contract, there is a point in time after which average ﬁrm size
and value decline with age. Assuming a constant outside value for ﬁrms’ assets, this
would result in a positive association between age and exit hazard rate.
Our paper also belongs to a large literature, started by Holmstrom (1979), that an-
2alyzes constrained–eﬃcient allocations in principal–agent models with hidden action.
Our work is part of the more recent tradition, begun by Rogerson (1985b), that ex-
plicitly considers multi–period relationships. A number of papers in this line of work,
among which Wang (1997) and Clementi, Cooley, and Wang (2006), have interpreted
the principal–agent relationship as one between shareholders and executives. This
alternative interpretation is also valid for our model.
Finally, our framework also has close ties to equilibrium models that allow for
capital accumulation in environments where market incompleteness is caused by
moral hazard. Among these, the closest work is by Bohacek (2005), who provides
conditions under which an economy ` a la Atkeson and Lucas (1995) admits a sta-
tionary and ergodic distribution of consumption. Other papers in this class include
Marcet and Marimon (1992), Khan and Ravikumar (2001), and Espino (2005).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in
Section 2. In Section 3 we characterize the constrained–eﬃcient allocations that arise
in two special cases of our environment, namely one with no dynamics and one with
dynamics but no capital accumulation. That analysis helps building intuition for the
results illustrated in Section 4, where the general model is considered. In Section 5 we
discuss the empirical relevance of our theory. Section 6 is dedicated to comparative
statics exercises. Section 7 considers the scenario in which shocks are autocorrelated.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1,2,... There are two agents, who we will refer to
as investor and entrepreneur, respectively. The latter is endowed with a technology,
that produces a homogeneous good with capital as the only input. Output (yt) is
given by
yt = θtf(kt),
where f is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave, kt ∈ [k,k] ⊂ ℜ+ is
capital, and θt ∈ Θ ⊂ ℜ+ is a random variable distributed according to the time–
invariant distribution function G(θt|at). The variable at ∈ A ≡ [a,a] ∈ ℜ+ denotes
managerial eﬀort. We assume that G has a density denoted by g, which is twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable with respect to a, and that Θ is compact. Capital depreciates
at the rate δ ∈ (0,1).2
2Decreasing returns and depreciation ensure that the eﬃcient choice of capital will be bounded.
In our applications, k will always be higher than such bound.
3While the output of the production process is public knowledge, the eﬀort exerted
by the entrepreneur is her private information.
At the outset, the investor provides the entrepreneur with capital k1. We do not
model the bargaining process by which the two agents agree on such level of capital
and on a particular split of the surplus. We also assume that any further investment
must be ﬁnanced with resources produced internally. It follows that, at all t,
ct + xt ≤ θtf(kt), (1)
where ct ≥ 0 is the entrepreneur’s consumption and xt denotes investment. Since
condition (1) requires that payoﬀs to the investor be non–negative, we will refer to it
as the limited liability constraint. The law of motion for capital is the usual one:
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + xt.
The last two conditions imply the following resource constraint:
ct ≤ θtf(kt) + (1 − δ)kt − kt+1.
We assume that the investor is risk–neutral, while the entrepreneur is risk–averse.
The latter’s static preferences are represented by the utility function u(ct) − a. We
posit that u( ) belongs to the CRRA class, i.e. u(c) = c1−χ
1−χ , χ  = 1.
For χ > 1, the function u(c) is unbounded below. As it will be clear below,
this means that in such a scenario the set of utilities that a feasible and incentive
compatible contract can award to the entrepreneur is also unbounded. Since our
techniques require boundedness, we will assume that χ < 1 unless otherwise noted.
We posit that agents discount future utility streams at the common rate 1
β − 1,
where β ∈ (0,1). This restriction will be relaxed in Section 6, where we will consider
the case in which the entrepreneur is relatively more impatient.
We allow for history–dependent pure strategies. If we let h0 denote the empty his-
tory, then the history at time t ≥ 1 is given by the sequence ht = h0 ∪ {(θs,ks)}t
s=1.
The investor’s task is to oﬀer the entrepreneur an incentive scheme (contract) σ =
{at(ht−1,kt),ct(ht),kt+1(ht−1,kt)}∞
t=1. This notation reﬂects the assumption that in-
vestment is chosen at the beginning of every period, before the realization of the
shock.3 The timing is summarized in Figure 1.
Given ht and kt+1, the continuation proﬁle of a contract σ from date t + 1 on-
wards is denoted as σ|ht,kt+1. Conditional on the entrepreneur taking the actions
3In Section 4 we comment brieﬂy on how the constrained–eﬃcient allocation would change, if we
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Figure 1: Timing in period t.
recommended by such proﬁle, her and the investor’s continuation values are denoted
by ω(σ|ht,kt+1) and v(σ|ht,kt+1), respectively.
A contract σ is said to be feasible if, at all times and after any history, eﬀort
recommendations belong to the set A and the resource constraint is satisﬁed.
Deﬁnition 1 A contract σ is feasible if, for all t ≥ 1,
at(ht−1,kt) ∈ A, ∀ ht−1,kt, (2)
and
0 ≤ ct(ht) ≤ θtf(kt) + (1 − δ)kt − kt+1(ht−1,kt), ∀ ht. (3)
The temporary incentive compatibility constraint rules out one–shot deviations at
all dates and after all histories. It can be formally stated as follows:






u(ct(ht)) − a + βω(σ|ht,kt+1)
￿
g(θt|a)dθt. (4)
Given our assumptions, the unimprovability principle guarantees that condition (4)
also rules out any arbitrary sequence of deviations from the investor’s eﬀort recom-
mendation plan.4
4See Green (1987).
5The fact that the set A is a connected subset of ℜ+ suggests that rewriting (4) as a
ﬁrst–order condition may be handy. In the literature, this is known as the ﬁrst–order
approach, which is not universally valid. To ensure its validity, we follow Rogerson
(1985a) and Spear and Srivastava (1987) in assuming that the Monotone Likelihood
Ratio Property and the Convexity of the Conditional Distribution Condition hold.
Let Ω be the set of pairs (k,ω) such that there exists a feasible and incentive




(k,ω) ∈ ∆ | ∃ σ s.t. (2), (3), (4), k1 = k, and ω(σ|h0) = ω
￿
.
For every (k,ω) ∈ Ω, deﬁne Φ(k,ω) as the set of the investor’s expected dis-
counted utilities that can be generated by feasible and incentive compatible contracts
delivering ω to the entrepreneur for given k. That is,
Φ(k,ω) =
￿
v(σ|h0) | ∃ σ s.t. (2), (3), (4), k1 = k, and ω(σ|h0) = ω
￿
.
Proposition 1 Φ(k,w) is compact ∀(k,ω) ∈ Ω.5
For given (k,ω), the investor’s problem is to choose a feasible and incentive com-
patible contract σ that attains the maximum element in Φ(k,ω). Denote such element
as v∗(k,ω).
Proposition 2 shows that v∗(k,ω) is a ﬁxed point of the operator T, which maps
the space of bounded and continuous functions v : Ω → ℜ into itself, with the sup













u(c(θ)) − a + βω′(θ)
￿






u(c(θ)) − a + βω′(θ)
￿
g(θ|a)dθ, (6)
0 ≤ c(θ) ≤ θf(k) − k′ + k(1 − δ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, (7)
(k′,ω′(θ)) ∈ Ω ∀θ ∈ Θ. (8)
Proposition 2 v∗(k,ω) = T(v∗)(k,ω) for all (k,ω) ∈ Ω.
5All the results and the proofs not included in the main text can be found in Appendix A.
6Since T satisﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for a contraction, the contraction
mapping theorem ensures that the ﬁxed point is unique. Solving for it also yields
policy functions for recommended eﬀort a(k,ω), capital k′(k,ω), entrepreneur’s cash
ﬂows c(k,ω,θ), and continuation utility ω′(k,ω,θ), all of which can be used to recover
the constrained–eﬃcient contract in a straightforward manner.6
By adapting results from Abreu, Pierce, and Stacchetti (1990) to our environ-
ment, Proposition 3 shows that Ω is the ﬁxed point of the set operator B, deﬁned as
follows.
Deﬁnition 3 For any arbitrary Σ ∈ ℜ2, let




s.t. (5), (6),(7), and (k′,ω′(θ)) ∈ Σ,∀θ}.
Proposition 3 (a) Ω = B(Ω). (b) Take any closed and bounded set X0 such that
Ω ⊆ X0. Let Xn+1 = B(Xn), for n = 0,1,2,... Then, lim
n→∞Xn = Ω.
Proposition 3 also shows that the sequence constructed by iterating on B starting
with a compact superset of Ω converges to the set Ω itself. This result will be useful
in the numerical approximation of the constrained Pareto–optimal allocation.
In the next section, we make assumptions about functional forms and parameters
that we will maintain for the remainder of the paper. The algorithms that were
designed to approximate the set Ω and the function v(k,ω) are described in Appendix
B.
2.1 Numerical Implementation
We assume that the production function is f(k) = kα, α ∈ (0,1). Furthermore,
we posit that A = [0,¯ a] and Θ = {θl,θh}, with θh > θl > 0 and G(θl|a) = e−a.7
While this choice of conditional distribution is mostly dictated by tractability, it has
appealing features. The probability of a good outcome is zero if no eﬀort is exerted,
and goes to 1 as eﬀort grows unboundedly large. Furthermore, the marginal eﬀect
of eﬀort on the probability of success is decreasing in the eﬀort itself. From now on,
all variables that are contingent on the shock realization will be denoted with the
subscripts l or h.
6Since the investor is risk–neutral, her return function is not bounded. The claims just made about
the operator T still hold true, as capital is bounded by assumption and consumption is bounded as
a result of constraint (7).
7The upper bound ¯ a will be chosen so as to ensure it never binds.




)[θhkα − ch + βv(k′,ωh)] + e−a∗
[θlkα − cl + βv(k′,ωl)]
+ k(1 − δ) − k′ (P1)
s.t. (1 − e−a∗
)[u(ch) + βωh] + e−a∗
[u(cl) + βωl] − a∗ = ω, (9)
a∗ ∈ argmax
a∈A
(1 − e−a)[u(ch) + βωh] + e−a [u(cl) + βωl] − a, (10)




∈ Ω ∀ i = h,l. (12)
For all (k,ω) ∈ Ω, v(k,ω) yields the expected discounted value of the cash ﬂows
that will accrue to the investor, conditional on capital and promised utility being
equal to k and ω, respectively. For this reason, it can be thought of as outside equity.
We denote as C(k,ω) the expected discounted cost to the investor of delivering ω to
the entrepreneur, when the current capital stock is k. The function C(k,ω) solves the
following functional equation:







where the asterisks designate the optimal choices generated by problem (P1). Since
C(k,ω) is also the expected discounted value of the cash ﬂows that will accrue to the
entrepreneur, we will often refer to it as the value of inside equity.
Unless stated otherwise, the parameter values used to compute the examples in the
remainder of the paper are those reported in Table 1. Even though we set β,χ,α, and
δ to values that are standard in the macroeconomics literature, we wish to emphasize
that by no means should this be considered a calibration exercise.
k ¯ k β χ α δ θh θl
0 3.5 0.95 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.4
Table 1: Parameter Values.
3 The Optimal Contract Without Capital Accumulation
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the properties of the optimal incentive
schemes that obtain in two special cases of the environment described above. The
intuition gained here will be helpful in Section 4, where we will tackle the general
case.
83.1 The Static Case
We start by considering the scenario where the relationship between investor and
entrepreneur lasts only one period. Since boundedness is not an issue, we will char-
acterize the optimal contract for all χ  = 1.
We ﬁnd it convenient to reformulate the problem to let the investor choose utilities
rather than consumption allocations. To this end, denote the cost of delivering a
utility level u as c(u) = [(1 − χ)u]1/(1−χ). Obviously, c(u) is strictly increasing and
strictly convex.8
With some abuse of notation, denote as ui ≡ u(ci) the utility the entrepreneur
derives from consuming ci, for i = h,l, and let ¯ ui = u(θikα − δk). Finally, denote as
¯ ω(k) and ω(k) the supremum and inﬁmum elements of the set of utilities that can be
awarded to the entrepreneur by a feasible and incentive compatible contract, when
the installed capital is k. The two bounds are characterized by Lemma 3.
When capital in place is k, the value to the investor of delivering utility ω to the




)[θhkα − c(uh)] + e−a∗
[θlkα − c(ul)] − δk,
s.t. (1 − e−a∗
)uh + e−a∗
ul − a∗ = ω, (13)
a∗ = argmax
a∈A
(1 − e−a)uh + e−aul − a,
u ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα − δk), ∀ i = h,l,
where u = 0 if χ < 1 and u = −∞ otherwise. The constrained–eﬃcient allocations
are characterized formally in Proposition 4. Here we describe their main features with
the help of Figure 2.
From the incentive compatibility constraint it follows immediately that the recom-
mended eﬀort is a∗ = log(uh−ul). A higher eﬀort is implementable only by increasing
s ≡ uh − ul, the gap between contingent rewards.
Combining (13) with the expression for the eﬀort recommendation, the optimiza-








[θhkα − c(uh)] +
1
s
[θlkα − c(ul)] − δk,
s.t. uh = 1 + ω + log(s),
ul = 1 + ω + log(s) − s,
u ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα − δk) ∀ i = h,l.
8Notice that for χ < 1, c : ℜ
+ → ℜ
+. For χ > 1, c : ℜ
− → ℜ
+.


























Figure 2: Static Model. Policies for χ = 1/2 (left) and χ = 2 (right).
Necessary and suﬃcient condition for an interior solution is
1
s2[θh − θl]kα =
1







Notice that the term 1/s2 is the increase in the probability of success induced by a
marginal increase in s. The left–hand side of (14) is the expected marginal revenue
gain resulting from the rise in s. The right–hand side is the marginal increase in
the cost of compensating the entrepreneur. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the increased
probability of awarding uh rather than ul. The second term reﬂects the marginal
impact on the expected cost arising from an increase in the risk imposed on the
entrepreneur. By strict concavity of the utility function, this term is positive as well.
When the solution is interior (i.e. u < ul < ¯ ul), Figure 2 shows that the rec-
ommended level of eﬀort decreases with ω. As promised utility increases, incentive
provision becomes costlier. In turn, this implies that it is constrained–eﬃcient to
require the entrepreneur to exert less eﬀort. Proposition 4 establishes that χ ≥ 1/2
is a suﬃcient condition (although not necessary) for this property to hold.
Figure 2 also indicates that ul is constant for relatively high ω, signaling that the
limited liability constraint binds in the low state. Proposition 4 shows that when
¯ uh − ¯ ul > 1, as it is the case in our example, eﬀort grows with ω over this range.
When ¯ uh − ¯ ul ≤ 1, eﬀort is identically zero in the same region.
Finally, notice that, since utility is bounded below for χ < 1, eﬃcient eﬀort
provision must be increasing with ω for low expected utility. In other words, since
the constraint ul ≥ 0 binds in this region, larger values of ω can only be implemented
by increasing uh and therefore the eﬀort recommendation.
103.2 The Dynamic Case
We now consider the case in which the time horizon is inﬁnite, but there is no capital
accumulation. This scenario is very close to those analyzed by Spear and Srivastava
(1987) and Wang (1997). It diﬀers from the former in that we impose limited liability,
i.e. the entrepreneur’s cash–ﬂow must be non–negative. It diﬀers from the latter, since
Wang assumes that the eﬀort choice is binary and u(c) belongs to the CARA class.
With slight abuse of notation, let v(ω) denote the value accruing to the investor
when delivering utility ω to the entrepreneur and let s ≡ uh + βωh − (ul + βωl).
To begin, let χ < 1 and assume away the limited liability constraint. With no
upper bound on entrepreneur’s consumption, all levels of promised utility ω ≥ 0 could
be implemented by a feasible and incentive compatible contract. It would suﬃce to
require zero eﬀort and award consumption c[ω(1 − β)] at all future dates. Since the
function c( ) is unbounded above, this seriously impairs our ability to characterize the
solution.9 To make some progress, we assume an arbitrary upper bound ¯ ω > 0.
From the incentive compatibility constraint, it follows that recommended eﬀort is
a∗ = log(s), for s ≥ 1. Then, for all ω such that 0 ≤ ω ≤ ¯ ω, the value of outside













[θlkα − c(ul) + βv(ωl)] − δk,
(P2)
s.t. uh = ω + 1 + log(s) − βωh, (15)
ul = ω + 1 + log(s) − s − βωl, (16)
ui ≥ 0 ∀ i = h,l,
0 ≤ ωi ≤ ¯ ω ∀ i = h,l.
Proposition 5 Assume there is no limited liability constraint, χ < 1, and promised
utility is bounded above by ¯ ω > 0. Then, the value function v(ω) is strictly concave.
Furthermore, for all ω such that the optimal choices ωl and ωh are interior:
(a) ωl < ω < ωh;
(b) payments to the entrepreneur follow a sub–martingale.
Along with (15)–(16), the following conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for an
9In particular, we cannot prove that the Bellman operator maps bounded functions into bounded
functions. As a consequence, the conditions of the Contraction Mapping Theorem are not satisﬁed
and we cannot use standard arguments to show strict concavity of the value function.
11interior solution to Problem (P2):
c′(ui) = −v′(ωi), i = h,l (17)
and





Condition (17) requires that the investor distributes contingent utility awards
eﬃciently over time. Equation (18) is the analogue of condition (14). It indicates
that the forces that shape the optimal spread of utilities across states are essentially
the same as in the static case. The only diﬀerence is that the marginal beneﬁt
of increasing eﬀort also depends on the diﬀerence between the investor’s contingent
continuation values.


























In turn, strict concavity of the value function implies that ωl < ω < ωh.
Combining (19) and (17) yields a further condition, which is common to many
repeated hidden action models and was ﬁrst illustrated by Rogerson (1985b). Letting
si, uih, and uil denote next period’s choices contingent on the current state of nature












c′(uil), i = h,l. (21)
By proposition 3 of Rogerson (1985b), claim (b) in Proposition 5 follows immediately
from (21).
An analytical characterization of the dynamics of eﬀort is not possible. However,
all of our numerical examples indicate that eﬀort is not monotone in the state ω. It
is increasing for low values and eventually becomes decreasing.
The extreme point ω = 0 is an absorbing state. For that level of promised utility,
a∗ = 0 and ul = uh = 0 at all times. For low but strictly positive values of ω, the
probability of ending up in such ineﬃcient state is relatively high. In order to lower
such probability, utility should be delivered by lowering current consumption at the
12beneﬁt of future payoﬀs. Unfortunately such strategy is compromised by the lower
bound on utility.
For ul = 0, the promise–keeping constraint reads ω = uh+βωh−1−log[uh+β(ωh−
ωl)]. A marginal increase in recommended eﬀort raises the probability of success and
allows for higher utility in the high state, but also lowers ωl. A bad shock will bring
promised utility closer to 0. This is why eﬀort is low when promised utility is low. As
ω grows, the ability to provide incentives improves. For ω large enough, the choice
of ul becomes unconstrained. When this is the case, our numerical examples always
indicate that eﬀort decreases with promised utility.
We now turn to the eﬀects of introducing the limited liability constraint. Lemma
1 establishes that limited liability implies an upper bound for promised utility and
that such upper bound is an absorbing state of the dynamical system.
Lemma 1 For ¯ uh − ¯ ul > 1, the maximal element of the set Ω is ¯ ω = 1
1−β[¯ uh − 1 −
log(¯ uh−¯ ul)]. The constrained–eﬃcient contract is such that ui(¯ ω) = ¯ ui and ωi(¯ ω) = ¯ ω
for i = h,l. For ¯ uh − ¯ ul ≤ 1, ¯ ω =
¯ ul
1−β, with a∗(¯ ω) = 0, ul(¯ ω) = ¯ ul and ωl(¯ ω) = ¯ ω. In
either case, v(¯ ω) = 0.
Proof. We only prove the case of ¯ uh − ¯ ul > 1. The scenario for ¯ uh − ¯ ul ≤ 1 is





[uh + βωh] + e−a[ul + βωl] − a
s.t. 0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα − δk), ∀ i = h,l,
0 ≤ ωi ≤ ω ∀ i = h,l.
In turn, this means that as long as eﬀort is strictly positive, ¯ ω satisﬁes
¯ ω = max
s≥1,uh,ωh
uh + βωh − 1 − log(s),
s.t. 0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα − δk), ∀ i = h,l,
0 ≤ ωi ≤ ¯ ω ∀ i = h,l.
The solution of the optimization problem requires that current and continuation util-
ities are set equal to their upper bounds. That is, ωi(¯ ω) = ¯ ω and ui(¯ ω) = ¯ ui for
i = h,l. Furthermore, ¯ ω = 1
1−β[¯ uh − 1 − log(¯ uh − ¯ ul)] and v(¯ ω) = 0.
Unfortunately, standard suﬃcient conditions for concavity of the value function
do not hold in this scenario, as the feasible set is not convex. However, in all our
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Figure 3: Value and Policy Functions for χ = 1/2 and ¯ uh − ¯ ul > 1.
numerical examples the value function turned out to be strictly concave. Figure 3
refers to one such example.
Consistent with the above discussion, the policy for eﬀort is increasing for low
ω. This is why the value function is also increasing in that range, implying that the
contract is not renegotiation–proof. Once ω is such that ul > 0, recommended eﬀort
and the spread between current utility awards decline with ω. Finally, for relatively
high levels of the state variable, the limited liability constraint binds in the bad state
of nature. Given the upper bound on continuation utility ω, implementing higher ω
necessarily requires increasing the spread between current utilities.
The dynamical system has two absorbing points, for ω = 0 and ω = ¯ ω. All of
our simulations indicate that the latter is the only attractor. For all strictly positive
initial conditions, the sequence {ωt} converges to ¯ ω almost surely. On average, the
entrepreneur’s consumption increases over time, converging to its rest point from
14below. Eﬀort increases on average when the promised utility is relatively close to 0
and decreases for higher values.
Higher eﬀort is elicited at the cost of lower insurance. The shape of the utility
function is such that the pecuniary cost of compensating the entrepreneur for risk is
increasing in ω. Given the relatively high intertemporal elasticity of substitution, this
cost is minimized by letting the entrepreneur’s consumption grow over time. It follows
that, over the renegotiation–proof region, consumption and leisure are complementary
ways of delivering utility to the entrepreneur: high eﬀort and low consumption early
on, followed by (relatively) low eﬀort and high consumption later on.
For χ > 1, the function u is unbounded below, meaning that all values ω such that
ω ≤ ¯ ω < 0 are implementable. When the solution is interior, condition (21) implies
that payments to the entrepreneur follow a super–martingale, and therefore decrease
on average. Other analytical results are not forthcoming.
In order to compute an approximation of the constrained–eﬃcient allocation, we
had to impose an arbitrary lower bound on promised utility ω, making sure that ω <
¯ ω. As expected, in all of our examples eﬀort is strictly decreasing in the state variable
ω. Because of the lower bound on promised utility, a strictly positive probability of
success implies that, in a non–degenerate interval to the right of ω, (1−1
s)ωh+1
sωl > ω.
Furthermore, (21) does not necessarily hold in the same interval.
Our simulations shows that the dynamical system admits a non–degenerate sta-
tionary distribution for all variables. Expected consumption growth is positive in an
interval to the right of ω.
4 The Full–ﬂedged Model with Capital Accumulation
We now turn to the general case with capital accumulation. Once again, let χ < 1.
We limit our attention to renegotiation–proof contracts. To this end, we assume that
promised utility is bounded below by ω > 0. This bound is chosen so that the value
of the investor is decreasing in ω, for all k.
The left panel of Figure 4 depicts Ω, the set of promised utilities that can be
delivered by a feasible and incentive–compatible contract, for ω = 10.5. The upper





[uh + βωh] + e−a[ul + βωl] − a (P3)
s.t. 0 ≤ ui ≤ u[θikα + (1 − δ)k − k′], ∀ i = h,l,
ω ≤ ωi ≤ ω(k′) ∀ i = h,l.
























































Figure 4: Set Ω and Value Function.
As expected, ¯ ω(k) is increasing in k. An increase in capital stock widens the
set of promised utilities that is feasible and incentive compatible to deliver to the
entrepreneur.
The solution to (P3) implies that, for every pair (k,ω) such that ω = ¯ ω(k),
constrained eﬃciency dictates ui(k,ω) = u[θikα + (1 − δ)k − k′], ωi(k,ω) = ¯ ω(k′) for
i = h,l, and v(k,ω) = 0.
The right panel shows that the value function is strictly increasing in the level of
capital and strictly decreasing in the entrepreneur’s promised utility ω. In all of our
numerical examples, v(k,ω) is also globally strictly concave. However, since standard
suﬃcient conditions for concavity are not satisﬁed, we cannot assert this as a general
property.
Figure 5 depicts the policy functions for current and promised utility. In the left
panel, we have plotted ui(k,ω), i = h,l. In the right panel, we have pictured the
contingent variation in promised utility ωi(k,ω) − ω, i = h,l.
For given capital stock, the entrepreneur’s contingent compensation schedules dis-
play the same qualitative features as in the case with no accumulation. The spread
between continuation utilities appears to be decreasing in ω, while the spread between
16current utilities is decreasing in ω for low values and increasing for high values. Once
again, this is due to the fact that, for ω high enough, the limited liability constraint


















































Figure 5: Compensation Policies.
The necessary condition for optimality of the eﬀort choice is the analogue of equa-
tions (18). Refer to the left panel of Figure 6. Consistent with the intuition developed
in Section 3, recommended eﬀort is increasing in the capital stock and decreasing in






















































Figure 6: Policy Functions for Eﬀort and Net Investment.
The novelty with respect to the simpler models analyzed above is capital accu-
mulation. The policy function for net investment is rendered in the right panel of
Figure 6, where we plotted max[0,k′(k,ω) − k].10 The most interesting feature is
10In order the make the picture more informative, we have inverted one of the axes.
17that, for given capital, net investment is declining in ω. The optimality conditions
tell us why this is the case.
Consider ﬁrst the scenario in which the limited liability constraint is slack. When





























αkα−1 + (1 − δ).





s2(θh − θl)αkα−1 ∂s
∂ω
. (23)
As long as ∂s/∂ω < 0, (23) says that the marginal beneﬁt deriving to the investor
from an increase in capital is decreasing in ω. The higher ω, the lower the optimal
utility spread s and the probability of success. In turn, this leads to a lower marginal
value of investment.
Now ﬁx k and consider the eﬀect of increasing ω on the optimal choice of k′.
As long as the value function is concave, such eﬀect will have the same sign as










∂ω, is positive. A higher value of ω today leads to a
lower utility spread s, which in turn increases the probability of a bad outcome.
Since ωh > ωl, this means that the eﬀect on the marginal gain is positive. On












∂ω is negative. In our simulations, the latter eﬀect
dominates. Investment decreases with ω.
When the limited liability constraint binds in the bad state of nature, the opti-

























with cl = θlkα+(1−δ)k−k′ and ul = u(cl). The term c′(ul)+
∂v(k′,ωl)
∂ωl is the marginal
eﬀect due to the impact of increasing investment on ωl. Since the limited liability
constraint binds, it must be negative. An increase in k′ distorts compensation in
the bad state of nature, leading to a drop in ul to the advantage of ωl. In other
words, an increase in k′ lowers the investor’s payoﬀ by reducing the insurance the
18contract provides to the entrepreneur. Unfortunately the comparative statics of k′ is
now considerably more involved. The role of the limited liability constraint in shaping
ﬁrm dynamics will be re–examined in Section 4.1.
Figure 7 illustrates one simulation of the system, starting from arbitrary initial
conditions. The state space is partitioned in four subsets. The policy for capital is




































Figure 7: Sample Path.
such that k′(k,ω) > k in regions A and B, and k′(k,ω) < k otherwise. The dynamics of
promised utility is such that in regions B and C, ωh(k,ω) > ω > ωl(k,ω). Irrespective
of the realization of the shock, promised utility increases in region A and decreases in
region D, respectively. In light of the above discussion, it is not surprising that the
locus separating regions B and C, along which net investment is identically zero, is
downward sloping for most values of k.
The scatter plot illustrates the dynamics of the state variables. The paths followed
by the other relevant variables are shown in Figure 8. When k and ω are relatively
low, the marginal product of capital is high and providing incentives is relatively
inexpensive. Therefore the returns to investment are high. Capital grows in both
states of nature. During the transition towards the locus separating the partitions B
an C, all other variables also increase on average. However, increases in both ω and
k lead to a progressive reduction in the marginal gain from capital accumulation.
Once reached the locus, incentive provision becomes so expensive to discourage
investment. From that moment onwards, a positive shocks leads to contemporaneous
increases in current and future payouts to the entrepreneur, and to a decrease in the







































Figure 8: Sample Path.
continuation value of the investor’s claim. The following period, the capital and eﬀort
choice will be lower. Conditional on negative shocks, the opposite will be true.11
On average, ω increases over time. This calls for lower eﬀort, lower capital, and
lower outside equity. Eventually the system converges to a steady state where outside
equity is zero and the entrepreneur’s promised utility lies on the upper contour of
the set Ω. The constrained–eﬃcient arrangement prescribes that in the limit the
entrepreneur controls all cash–ﬂow rights.
Notice further that, even at the steady state, the contract does not yield full in-
surance and requires strictly positive eﬀort. This result does not hold with generality.
When the diﬀerence between θh and θl is small enough, in the limit the entrepreneur
will end up receiving full insurance and exerting no eﬀort.
Figure 9 conﬁrms what we have learned so far. We have initialized the system by
assigning to the state variables the same initial conditions used to construct Figures 7
and 8. Then we have conducted a large number of 80–period long simulations and
plotted their simple averages. Early on all variables tend to increase. Eventually,
however, eﬀort, capital, and the value of the investor’s claim decline towards their
11Modifying the timing to allow capital to be chosen after the realization of the shock would
deﬁnitely enhance eﬃciency, but it would change the dynamics in any meaningful way. The main
diﬀerence would be that capital reacts to shock realizations with one period delay, rather than two
periods as is the case under our assumptions.


































Figure 9: Average Dynamics.
rest points.
We have assumed throughout that no other agent is able to operate the technology.
Or, alternatively, that the investor is fully committed to the contract. It would be
interesting to understand under what conditions the investor would be better oﬀ
by rescinding the contract, honor his promises by means of a constant sequence of
consumption, and hire someone else to manage the project. Spear and Wang (2005)
and Wang (2006) address this issue in simpler environments, without production or
capital accumulation.
4.1 The Role of the Limited Liability Constraint
In this section we discuss the allocation that obtains when we assume away the limited
liability constraint.
Without upper boundsto entrepreneur’s consumption, the problem is not bounded.
To make some progress in the analysis, we impose an exogenous upper bound for
promised utility.12
A ﬁrst and somewhat obvious ﬁnding is that, given ω and no matter the initial
12The simulation of which in Figure 10 was obtained by imposing ωi(k,ω) ≤ 50 for i = h,l and
for all (k,ω). However, the qualitative features illustrated below are the same, no matter the upper
bound.
21capital k1, it is optimal for the investor to invest (or disinvest) instantaneously until
the ﬁrm lies on the locus separating the partitions B and C of the state space (see
Figure 7).






























Figure 10: Stationary Distribution – Without Limited Liability.
Our numerical experiments also show that, as it was the case in our benchmark
scenario, positive shocks are followed by an increase in promised utility in the same
period and by lower capital and lower eﬀort in the following period. However, the
limiting behavior is diﬀerent. The dynamical system admits stationary distributions
for all relevant variables, illustrated in Figure 10.13
As long as ventures start out with a relatively low level of inside equity (i.e. low
ω), ﬁrm value, outside equity, size, and eﬀort will decrease over time. Inside equity
will increase.
The fact that ﬁrm value and size are maximal at the beginning of the life–cycle is
at odds with the empirical evidence. By requiring that investment be ﬁnanced by re-
tained earnings, the limited liability constraint avoids this unappealing feature. The
reader that feels uncomfortable with such assumption should consider that convex
capital adjustment costs of the type commonly assumed in the macroeconomic liter-
ature would lead to a dynamics which is qualitatively the same as in our benchmark
13The ﬁgure was obtained initializing the system with arbitrary levels of the state variables and
letting the system run for 50,000 period. We deleted the ﬁrst 500 realizations and reported the
frequency distributions.
22case. In particular, for a low enough initial capital stock, net investment would be
positive early on and would decrease (on average) later on.
4.2 The case of χ > 1
The main insight of this Section also applies to the case of χ > 1: positive shocks are
associated to an increase in promised utility in the same period and to lower capital
and lower eﬀort in the following period. However, diﬀerently from the case of χ < 1,
the dynamical system admits stationary non–degenerate limiting distributions for all
relevant variables. Figure 11 illustrates such distributions when χ = 2 and the lower
bound on promised utility is ω = −100.






























Figure 11: Stationary Distribution for χ = 2.
Our simulations also show that, when the system is initialized with relatively low
levels for capital and promised utilities, average dynamics is qualitatively similar to
that implied by our benchmark. In particular, capital, outside equity, and ﬁrm value
increase early on, and then decrease.
This is consistent with our brief discussion of the scenario with no capital accu-
mulation and χ > 1 (see Section 3.2). In particular, there will exist a region to the
right of ω such that continuation utility will increase on average whenever the system
lies in that interval.
When the solution is unconstrained, i.e. when the limited liability constraint
23does not bind and ωl > ω, Rogerson’s condition (21) also holds true in the scenario
under consideration. Notice however, that this has no implications for the dynamics
of continuation utility. That is, consumption falling over time does not imply that
promised utility must also fall, as the latter is delivered via both consumption and
leisure.
5 Empirical Relevance
Much of the empirical literature on ﬁrm dynamics has focused on growth and sur-
vival of relatively young ﬁrms.14 Among its most robust ﬁndings are that both exit
hazard rates and survivors’ growth rates decline with age, both unconditionally and
conditional on size. Models based on learning or ﬁnancing constraints have proven
successful in rationalizing both phenomena.15
As put by Caves (1998), however, “organizational geriatrics has received little
attention.” That is, little attention has been devoted to the dynamics of relatively
older ﬁrms. Notable exceptions are the studies conducted by Aggarwal and Gort
(1996, 2002) (AG hereafter) and Loderer, Neusser, and Waelchli (2009). Consistent
with most of the literature, they ﬁnd that hazard rates decrease with age early in life.
However, they also ﬁnd that ﬁrms eventually reach a senility point, after which exit
hazard rates increase with age. In this section we argue that, diﬀerently from other
theories of ﬁrm dynamics, our own is able to rationalize this evidence.
AG documented ﬁrm survival in ﬁve diﬀerent phases of the industry life–cycle.16
Aggarwal and Gort (1996) shows that the senility point exists no matter the phase in
which ﬁrms are born. Aggarwal and Gort (2002) argues that it exists no matter the
phase in which ﬁrms live. This evidence leads us to conclude that for every cohort
there exists a time after which, conditional on industry–wide factors, the value of the
average survivor declines with age.
In fact, none of the models of ﬁrm dynamics we referred to above are consistent
with this behavior. All of them predict that survivors’ size and value converge from
below to a stationary distribution. Exit hazard rates are monotonically decreasing
and converge to a constant.
14See Caves (1998) for a survey.
15See Jovanovic (1982) in the case of learning and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004),
Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Quadrini (2003) in the case of
ﬁnancing constraints.
16The ﬁve phases are supposed to track an industry in its path from infancy to maturity. AG
identify them operationally by means of Bahk and Gort (1993)’s criterion, based on the rate of net
entry.
24AG posit that the observed ﬁrm dynamics depends in part on the evolution of
ﬁrms’ “initial endowments,” among which Aggarwal and Gort (1996) include “ob-
served variables, such as an initial organization with a record of successful operation
in a related industry,” and “unobserved variables such as managerial talent.” In every
cohort, the average endowment level changes over time because of attrition of low en-
dowment ﬁrms and because of survivors’ net investment. As ﬁrms age, obsolescence
rises with respect to new investment. Eventually, net investment will turn negative
and lead ﬁrms to decline. According to AG, this is the mechanism responsible for the
fact that for relatively old ﬁrms, hazard rates increase with age.
AG’s argument has the ﬂavor of the simple technological theory of industry dy-
namics presented in Hopenhayn (1992). In that paper, a ﬁrm’s endowment is a
stationary and serially correlated random variable determining productivity. The av-
erage entrant has a lower endowment than the average incumbent, and is therefore
closer to the exit threshold. This assumption is responsible for the selection eﬀect
that drives the negative correlation between age and hazard rate. Because of the
stationarity of productivity, every cohort’s size distribution converges to an ergodic
distribution (also stationary, when re–scaled by its mass), characterized by a constant
exit rate. In turn, this means that the hazard exit rate also converges to a constant
from above.
In our model, the role of AG’s endowment is played by the entrepreneur’s con-
tinuation utility. When continuation utility is low, it is relatively cheap to induce
managerial eﬀort. Constrained–eﬃciency dictates high eﬀort and, as a result, the pro-
ductivity of capital is high. When the continuation utility is high, eliciting managerial
eﬀort is more expensive. It is eﬃcient to require less eﬀort and thus the productivity
of capital is low. In this sense, the endowment is high when the continuation utility
is low, and viceversa.
The analysis conducted in Section 4 suggests that almost surely there exists a
point in time after which the endowment is expected to decline. Think of a cohort
of ﬁrms whose dynamics are generated by our contract. Optimal incentive provision
prescribes that, on average, promised utility increases over time. In turn, this calls
for lower eﬀort and lower capital, which imply lower ﬁrm value. While we do not
explicitly model exit, it is clear that assuming a constant outside value for the assets
would yield a positive relation between age and exit hazard rate.
We conclude this section by speculating on our framework’s predictions for the
cross–sectional relationship between personal wealth and entrepreneurship. Newman
25(2007) shows that a static version of our model has a patently counterfactual impli-
cation. When individuals in a population are given the choice between working for a
wage (at zero risk) and becoming entrepreneurs, relatively rich people turn out to be
workers, and poor people become entrepreneurs. As long as the value assigned to the
agent by the contract is monotone in the agent’s wealth, it is easy to see why this is
the case. Everything else equal, the poorer the entrepreneur the cheaper is incentive
provision, and the larger is the payoﬀ to investors. Our analysis shows that in general
Newman (2007)’s conclusion is not warranted in a dynamic setting. While it is still
true that poorer people are more likely to try entrepreneurship, it is also true that
those among them that succeed become progressively wealthier.
6 Comparative Statics
In this section, we document how the optimal contract and the implied dynamics
change when we select alternative values for either the entrepreneur’s discount factor
or the support of the conditional distribution Θ.
6.1 An Impatient Entrepreneur
Throughout Sections 3 and 4 it was assumed that the two agents discount future
utility ﬂows at the same rate. Here we consider the case in which the entrepreneur
discounts future utility at the rate 1
ρ − 1, with ρ < β.
Figure 12 compares the policy functions that obtain for ρ = 0.495 with those of
the benchmark case. Given the entrepreneur’s preference for early consumption, the
optimal contract calls for a change in the time proﬁle of her cash ﬂows in favor of the
current period. The right panel on the bottom row shows that, everything else equal,
the entrepreneur receives higher payments in both states of nature.
When the limited liability constraint binds, i.e. when ul = u[θlkα + (1 − δ)k −
k′], a higher payment to the entrepreneur necessarily translates into fewer resources
available for investment. This is why, as illustrated on the right panel on the top
row, net investment is lower than in the benchmark. The left panel on the bottom
row shows that recommended eﬀort drops. This is consistent with our discussions
in Sections 3 and 4: a rise in current utility awards also raises the marginal cost of
eliciting eﬀort.
Our simulations show that, as in the case of χ > 1, capital, promised utility, as well
as the other relevant variables converge to non–degenerate stationary distributions.
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Figure 12: Policy Functions. Solid: benchmark. Dashed: ρ = 0.945
6.2 A Narrower Gap between θh and θl.
Since the probability of a good outcome is endogenous in our model, so is the distri-
bution of cash–ﬂows. This means that we cannot analyze the role of cash–ﬂow risk.
However, we can consider the impact of reducing the gap between the two realizations
of the productivity shock.
Figure 13 plots the policy functions that obtain by simultaneously lowering θh
from 1.5 to 1.45 and raising θl from 0.4 to 0.45. Everything else equal, a lower gap
reduces the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort. This is why the latter drops. In turn, lower
eﬀort means more insurance for the entrepreneur.
The right panel on the top row shows that investment is higher. Most likely, this
result depends on the fact that a higher θl relaxes the limited liability constraint in
the bad state of nature. As usual, investment is chosen to equate the marginal eﬀect
on future revenues to the opportunity cost. In Section 4 we have argued that when
the constraint binds, this cost also depends on the intertemporal distortion that is
caused by lower consumption in the low state. This is why eﬃciency dictates that
the larger revenues in the low state are allocated in part to increase compensation, as
argued above, and in part to increase investment.
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Figure 13: Policy Functions. Solid: benchmark. Dashed: θh = 1.45, θl = 0.45.
7 Auto–Correlated Shocks
So far we have assumed that a successful performance of the entrepreneur only aﬀects
the probability distribution of the variable θ in the same period. Although it is
shared by most of the literature on dynamic hidden action models,17 one may ﬁnd
this assumption to be particularly removed from reality. In this section we address
this concern by assuming that a successful outcome alters the probability distribution
in the future.
We posit that next period’s distribution conditional on success in the current pe-
riod stochastically dominates the distribution conditional on failure, i.e. G(θ′|a′,θh) <
G(θ′|a′,θl), for all a′ ∈ A. In the numerical implementation, we assume that prob(θ′ =
θh|θ = θi) = 1 − e−ψia, with ψh > ψl > 0. The realization of θ in the previous pe-
riod is now a state variable, as it pins down the only parameter of the probability
distribution.
Notice that our modeling choice is diﬀerent from that of Fernandes and Phelan
(2000). In their case, next period’s distribution depends on current eﬀort (which is
private information), rather than on the current realization (public information).
Figure 14 illustrates value and policy functions along the ω dimension, for given
17For example, see Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Wang (1997).
28capital stock. Solid lines refer to ψh = 1.4, while dashed lines refer to ψl = 0.8.
All the other parameters are as described in Table 1. For ψ = ψh, a given level of
eﬀort leads to a higher probability of success. With respect to the case of ψ = ψl,
the promised utility ω is delivered by requiring more eﬀort and awarding greater
average consumption and expected continuation utility. Given the higher probability
of a good outcome, this plan can be implemented by lowering the state–contingent
payoﬀs to the entrepreneur, both in the present and in the future. This is why
ci(k,ω,ψl) > ci(k,ω,ψh) and ωi(k,ω,ψl) > ωi(k,ω,ψh) for all ω and for i = h,l.
Net investment is also higher for ψ = ψh, in spite of a greater average continu-
ation utility. The main mechanism of the baseline model is still at work. That is,
everything else equal higher continuation utility makes incentive provision costlier
and calls for less investment. However, a good realization in the previous period
raises the probability of a good outcome in the future. Ceteris paribus, this leads to a
greater expected marginal value of investment. The strength of this new mechanism
will depend on the diﬀerence between θh and θl.
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Figure 14: Policy Functions. Solid: ψ = ψh. Dashed: ψ = ψl.
Figure 15 illustrates the eﬀects of persistence on the dynamics of all relevant vari-
ables. A good shock is associated with higher consumption and higher continuation
utility. However, diﬀerently from the benchmark scenario, ﬁrm value as well as next
29period’s investment and recommended eﬀort are also higher following a good shock.
Why is this the case?
For simplicity, consider the case of a good realization when the probability dis-
tribution is parameterized by ψl. That is, when the realization of the shock in the
previous period was low. On the one hand, the rise in continuation utility triggered
by the positive outcome still calls for lower eﬀort in the future and therefore implies a
lower marginal value of investment. On the other hand, the improvement in the prob-
ability distribution calls for greater eﬀort and raises the marginal value of investment.
For our parameter values, the latter eﬀect dominates.
The baseline model described in Section 4 predicts a negative correlation between
cash–ﬂows and investment for relatively old ﬁrms. Simply allowing for persistence in
the shock can overturn this result, generating a positive correlation.
Similarly to the benchmark scenario, the value of outside equity converges to zero
and the entrepreneur ends up controlling all cash–ﬂow rights. However, the ergodic
set for the state variables is now a non–degenerate subset of Ω’s upper contour. As
the investor’s payoﬀ settles down to its long–run value, the other variables are time–
varying.





































Figure 15: Sample Path. Case with State–Dependent Shock Distribution
308 Conclusion
In this paper we have characterized the ﬁrm dynamics implied by constrained–eﬃcient
contracts between a risk–neutral investor and a risk–averse entrepreneur under the
assumption that the latter’s eﬀort is not publicly observable.
A robust feature of the model is that the marginal gain from investing declines
with the level of promised utility. This happens because the cost of incentive provision
is increasing in ω. In turn, this means that the higher ω, the lower recommended
eﬀort and the probability of success are, and therefore the lower the return to capital
accumulation is.
When the entrepreneur’s relative risk aversion coeﬃcient is less than 1 and the two
agents are equally impatient, ω and the value of inside equity follow sub–martingale
processes. Firms that, consistent with the empirical evidence, start out small, have a
relatively high marginal product of capital, and therefore grow over time. The grad-
ualness of the growth process depends on the limited liability assumption, which can
be interpreted as a ﬁnancing constraint or an extreme form of investment adjustment
costs. Making eﬀort extraction costlier, the rise in the value of promised utility im-
plies a drop in the return to investment, which eventually leads to a decline in the
capital stock. In this sense, our theory provides a rationale for ﬁrm decline. This
feature distinguishes our model from other theories of ﬁrm dynamics. According to
those, average ﬁrm size and value increase monotonically over time.
Interestingly, the constrained–eﬃcient contract prescribes that in the long run the
entrepreneur becomes the only claimant to the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows.
When the RRA coeﬃcient is larger than 1 or the entrepreneur is relatively more
impatient, the dynamics of observables has the same qualitative features, as long
as the initial values of capital and promised utility are relatively low. What distin-
guishes these scenarios from our benchmark is that the model admits non–degenerate
stationary distributions for ﬁrm size and the other relevant variables.
A key mechanism in our theory is that providing incentives to exert eﬀort becomes
costlier as the manager increases her stake in the ﬁrm. We believe that it would be
interesting to extend our framework by allowing for the possibility of termination.
In other words, by empowering the investor to liquidate the entrepreneur and hire
someone else to run operations. The insights provided by Spear and Wang (2005)
and Wang (2006) may prove useful in carrying out this task.
We believe that it would also be of interest to study the dynamics implied by our
31model under diﬀerent assumptions on preferences. The results by Rampini (2004)
hint that under certain conditions the results could be quite diﬀerent. In his study of
the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and the business cycle, he ﬁnds that
when preferences are of the type u(c−a), risk tolerance is increasing with wealth and
therefore incentive provision is cheaper. This is exactly the contrary of what happens
in this paper.
32A Proofs and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 1.
Fix the pair (k,ω). We already know that Φ(k,w) is bounded. It is left to prove that
it is also closed. Let {Vn} ⊆ Φ(k,w), where Vn → V∞ when n → ∞. We need to show
that V∞ ∈ Φ(k,w). In words, we need to demonstrate that there exists a contract σ∞
that satisﬁes (2), (3), (4), ω(σ∞|h0) = w, and v(σ∞|h0) = V∞. Now we will construct
such an optimal contract σ∞. By the deﬁnition of Φ(k,w), there exists a sequence of
contracts {σn} = {an
t (ht−1),cn
t (ht)} and capital {kn
t+1(ht−1)}, where the constraints








t (ht) − kn
t+1(ht−1) + (1 − δ)kt]g(θt|an
t (ht−1))dht
For t = 1, notice that {an
1(h0),cn
1(h1)} and {kn
2(h0)} are ﬁnite collections of bounded















1 (h1) = c∞
1 (h1), and lim
nq→∞k
nq
2 (h0) = k∞
2 (h0).
We now consider t = 2. Notice that {an
2(h1),cn
2(h2)} and {kn
3(h1)} are ﬁnite col-
lections of bounded sequences, and we can deﬁne {a∞
2 (h1),c∞
2 (h2)} and {k∞
3 (h1}
similarly as we did for t = 1. If we iterate this procedure for t = 3,4,..., and let
σ∞ = {a∞
t (ht−1),c∞
t (ht)} along with k = {k∞
t+1(ht−1)}, then it is easy to verify that
the constructed contract σ∞ is what we desired for.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Fix ω, the lifetime discounted utility ensured by the optimal contract to the agent, and
k, the optimal capital level of the ﬁrm. First, we show that T(v∗)(k,ω) ≤ v∗(k,ω).
This inequality is true if there exists a feasible and incentive compatible contract
σ such that ω(σ|h0) = ω and v(σ|h0) = T(v∗)(k,ω). The desired contract σ can
be constructed in the following way. Let a(k,ω), c(θ,k,ω), k′(k,ω), and ω′(θ,k,ω)
denote the solution of the maximization problem associated with the deﬁnition of
T(v∗)(k,ω). Now, let a1(h0) = a(k,ω), c1(h1) = c(θ1,k,ω), and k2(h0) = k′(k,ω),
∀h1 for k = k1 given. For the realization of θ in t = 1, denoted θ1 for the purpose of this
proof, there exists a feasible and incentive compatible contract σθ1 that ensures a level
of expected discounted utility ω′(θ1,k,ω) to the agent, and v∗(k′(k,ω),ω′(θ1,k,ω))
to the principal. Thus, we can say that σ|h1 = σθ1, ∀h1. It is obvious that the
constructed contract σ is what is desired.
33We now need to show that v∗(k,ω) ≤ T(v∗)(k,ω). Let σ∗ be an optimal contract
that ensures a level of expected discounted utility of ω to the agent, given k. In
















where the last inequality is obtained by letting a(k,ω) = a∗(h0,k1), c(θ,k,ω) =
c∗
1(θ1,k1), ω′(θ,k,ω) = ω′(σ∗|h0) along with k′(k,ω) = k∗
2(h0,k1), for given k = k1.
This solution satisﬁes the constraints (5), (6), (7), and (8).
Notice that the operator B is monotone, i.e. Σ1 ⊆ Σ2 implies that B(Σ1) ⊆ B(Σ2).
Following Abreu, Pierce, and Stacchetti (1990), we say that Σ is self–generating if
Σ ⊆ B(Σ).
Lemma 2 (a) Ω is self–generating. (b) If Σ is self–generating, then B(Σ) ⊆ Ω.
Proof. To prove (a), let (k,ω) ∈ Ω. There exists a contract σ = {at(ht−1),ct(ht)} and
a sequence {kt+1(ht−1)} which satisfy the constraints (2), (3), (4), and ω(σ|h0) = ω.
We now say that
a(k,ω) = a1(h0); k′(k,ω) = k2(h0); c(θ,k,ω) = c1({θ}), ∀θ; ω′(θ,k,ω) = ω2(σ|{θ}), ∀θ.
It is obvious that {a(k,ω),c(θ,k,ω),k′(k,ω),ω′(θ,k,ω)}, deﬁned above, satisﬁes
the constraints (5), (6),(7), and (8). Therefore, (k,ω) ∈ B(Ω), which demonstrates
that (a).
To prove (b), let Σ be self–generating, and let (k,ω)h0 ∈ B(Σ). We have to
construct a contract σ = {at(ht−1),ct(ht)} and a sequence kt+1(ht−1) = kh0 that
satisfy the constraints (2), (3), (4), and ω(σ|h0) = ωh0. We construct such a contract
recursively. First, there exist {a(kh0,ωh0),c(θ,kh0,ωh0),k′(kh0,ω h0),ω′(θ,kh0,ωh0)}







0 ≤ c(θ,kh0,ωh0) ≤ θf(k) − kh0 + (1 − δ)k.
34For t = 1, let a1(h0) = a(kh0,ωh0) and c1(h1) = c(θ1,kh0,ωh0), ∀h1. Also, let
k′
h0 = kh1 = k′(kh0,ωh0) and ωh1 = ω′(θ,kh0,ωh0), ∀h1. Notice that (kh1,ωh1) ∈ Σ ∈
B(Σ) implies the existence of {a(kh1,ωh1),c(θ,kh1,ωh1),k′(kh1,ωh1),ω′(θ,kh1,ωh1)}







0 ≤ c(θ,kh1,ωh1) ≤ θf(k) − kh1 + (1 − δ)k.
We can iterate for t = 2,3,4,... to construct the complete proﬁle σ. We can then
observe that, by construction, for any arbitrary t ≥ 0 and ht,




Since 0 < β < 1 and the utilities are bounded, the above equation implies that
ω(σ|ht) = ωht ∀ t ≥ 0 and ∀ ht.
Hence, the contract that we have constructed is what is desired.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Part (a) is obvious. To show part (b), we will ﬁrst show that the sequence {Xn} is
convergent. Clearly, B(X0) ⊆ X0. Next, we operate B on both sides of this expression
and obtain Xn+1 = B(Xn) ⊆ Xn, ∀n, because B is monotone increasing. Hence, {Xn}






Now, we show that Ω ⊆ X∞. Given that Ω ⊆ X0, the monotonicity property of B
ensures that B(Ω) ⊆ B(X0). However, it must be true that Ω = B(Ω), by part (a),
and B(X0) = X1, by construction. Then, Ω ⊆ X1. By iteration we obtain Ω ⊆ Xn,
∀n ≥ 0, and consequently, Ω ⊆ X∞. Now, we demonstrate that X∞ ⊆ Ω. Given
the properties of the sequence {Xn}, we have that B(X∞) = X∞. Hence, X∞ is
self–generating, and X∞ = B(X∞) ⊆ Ω.
Lemma 3 Let k ≥ (θl/δ)
1/(1−α). If ¯ uh − ¯ ul < 1, then ¯ ω(k) = ¯ ul. If ¯ uh − ¯ ul > 1, then
¯ ω(k) = ¯ uh − 1 − log(¯ uh − ¯ ul). For χ < 1, ω(k) = 0. For χ > 1, ω(k) = −∞.
Proof. The value ¯ ω(k) is given by





s.t. a∗ = argmax
a (1 − e−a)uh + e−aul − a,
u ≤ ui ≤ ¯ ui i = h,l.
35Conditional on the optimal level of eﬀort being zero, the solution calls for ul = ¯ ul.
When eﬀort is strictly positive, then problem rewrites as
¯ ω(k) = max
uh,ul
uh − 1 − log(uh − ul)
and the solution calls for ui = ¯ ui, i = h,l. Since uh −ul > 1 implies uh −1−log(uh −
ul) > ul it follows that ¯ ω(k) = ¯ ul for ¯ uh − ¯ ul < 1 and ¯ ω(k) = ¯ uh − 1 − log(¯ uh − ¯ ul)
otherwise.
Now turn to ω(k). For χ > 1, any level of utility ω < ¯ ul can be awarded by setting
a∗ = 0 and cl = c(ω). Such allocation is feasible and incentive compatible. For χ < 1,
any ω such that 0 ≤ ω ≤ ¯ ul can be delivered in exactly the same way. Therefore,
ω(k) ≤ 0. By contradiction, assume that ω(k) < 0. Obviously, this must happen for
a∗ > 0. However, in this case promised utility is ul + ea∗
− 1 − a∗, which is always
non negative for a∗ > 0.
For any k > 0, let ωb(k) be equal to the inﬁmum of the set of values ω such
that the constraint ui ≥ u does not bind. It is easy to see that such set is always
non–empty.
Proposition 4 When recommended eﬀort is positive, a∗ = log(uh − ul). Further-
more:
(a) if χ ≥ 1/2, a∗ is strictly decreasing in ω and uh and ul are strictly increasing in
ω for all ω such that the solution is interior;
(b) assume ul ≤ ¯ ul binds; if ¯ uh − ¯ ul < 1, then a∗ = 0, otherwise a∗ = log(u∗
h − ¯ ul),
where u∗
h satisﬁes u∗
h − 1 − log(u∗
h − ¯ ul) − ω;
(c) let χ < 1; if [θh − θl]kα > c(1), there exists ωr > 0 such that ul = 0 and
uh −1 −log(uh) = ω for all ω ∈ [0,ωr]. If [θh − θl]kα ≤ c(1), then a∗ = 0 and ul = ω
for all ω.
Proof. To prove (a), consider the necessary condition for an interior solution:

































When c′( ) is convex, suﬃciency follows from the convexity of the cost function. This





u . Applying the implicit function theorem to (24) reveals that χ ≥ 1/2
is suﬃcient, although not necessary condition for ds
dω < 0. In turn, this directly implies
dul
dω > 0. To see that
duh
dω > 0 must hold, start from a pair (k,ω) and consider an




dω > 0, for the right–hand side to remain unchanged it must be that
duh
dω > 0.
When ¯ uh − ¯ ul < 1 and ω is such that ul = ¯ ul, a positive eﬀort recommendation
is not incentive compatible. This is not the case when ¯ uh − ¯ ul > 1. In such scenario,
any increase in ω must be accommodated by raising uh. This shows (b).
Now let χ < 1. For ω = 0, it is obvious that a∗ = 0 and uh = ul = 0. In fact,
if it were the case that a∗ > 0, (24) would have to hold for s > 1, which in turn
would imply ul < 0. Now consider an inﬁnitesimal increase in ω. The constraint
s − log(s) ≤ 1 + ω relaxes. By continuity, however, it will still be the case that the
left–hand side of (24) is still strictly positive over the admissible range of s. Since
the left–hand side of (24) is decreasing in ω, when [θh − θl]kα > c(1) there will be a
positive value of ω such that (24) holds true for s such that s − log(s) ≤ 1 + ω. On
the other hand, if [θh − θl]kα ≤ c(1), this will never be the case.
Proof of Proposition 5. Claims (a) and (b) are proven in the main body of the
paper. Strict concavity follows from Theorem 4.8 in Stokey and Lucas (1989). To
see why this is the case, rewrite the optimization program in (P2) as the operator
T , which maps the set of bounded and continuous functions deﬁned over [0, ¯ ω] into
itself:













[θlkα − c(ω + 1 + log(s) − s − βωl) + βv(ωl)] − δk,
s.t. ω + 1 + log(s) − βωh ≥ 0,
ω + 1 + log(s) − s − βωl ≥ 0,
0 ≤ ωi ≤ ¯ ω ∀ i = h,l.
First, notice that since a∗ = max[0,log(s)] a ∈ [0,¯ a], s is bounded. This implies that
the choices of uh and ul are also bounded. Furthermore, the constraint set is convex,
in the following sense. Let Γ(ω) denote the set of feasible triplets κ = (s,ωh,ωl) when
the state is ω. For all pairs ωa,ωb ∈ [0, ¯ ω] and all {κa,κb} such that κa ∈ Γ(ωa) and
κb ∈ Γ(ωb), ηκa + (1 − η)κb ∈ Γ[ηωa + (1 − η)ωb] for all η ∈ [0,1].
Finally, strict convexity of the function c guarantees that for all concave, bounded
37and continuous functions v deﬁned over [0, ¯ ω], (T )(v)(ηωa+(1−η)ωb) > η(T )(v)(ωa)+
(1 − η)(T )(v)(ωb), for all ωa,ωb ∈ [0, ¯ ω] and all η ∈ [0,1].
B Algorithm
In this section we provide a brief description of the algorithm that was used to compute
a numerical approximation to the value function v(k,ω). Given that the set Ω is not
square, it is not eﬃcient to approximate the value function by means of bi–dimensional
splines. For this reason, we will restrict the choice of capital to a ﬁnite number of
levels and approximate the value function on the ω dimension by means of cubic
splines.
We start by deﬁning a ﬁne grid for the capital stock. Denote it as K ≡ {kj}
nk
j=1
and let the related set of indexes be J ≡ {j}
nk
j=1. The upper bound of K must be
chosen in such a way that the corresponding net investment will be negative for all ω.
For this to be the case, it is suﬃcient to set it equal to the eﬃcient capital stock when






task consists in approximating the equilibrium value set of the transformed problem.
B.1 Approximation of the Set Ω
From the analysis conducted in Section 2, it follows that for every j ∈ J, the set
of feasible and incentive compatible values will be given by an interval [ω, ¯ ωj] ∈ ℜ+.
This means that our task reduces to approximate the mapping Ω : K → ℜ+ which is
given by the sequence {¯ ωj}j∈J. The mapping Ω can be shown to be increasing and
strictly concave.
Following Abreu, Pierce, and Stacchetti (1990), we start by deﬁning an initial
guess Ω0 = {¯ ω0j}j∈J. We impose that Ω0 is weakly increasing, weakly concave,
and such that ¯ ω0j ≥ ¯ ωj for all j. These requirements are satisﬁed by letting ¯ ω0j =
u(θhkα
nk−δknk)
1−β . Then, for every j,q ∈ J such that θlkα





[uh + βωh] + e−a[ul + βωl] − a (25)
s.t. 0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq),
ω ≤ ωi ≤ ¯ ωnq
and
¯ ωn+1,j ≡ max
j
{bjq}. (26)
38The operator deﬁned by (25)–(26) generates a sequence {Ωn} that converges to Ω.
Our approximation will be Ωm such that ||Ωm − Ωm−1||∞ < 10.0−8.





s.t. 0 ≤ ul ≤ u(θlkα + k(1 − δ) − kj),
ω ≤ ωl ≤ ¯ ωnj.
Obviously the solution calls for ul = u(θlkα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq) and ωl = ¯ ωnq. Alterna-
tively, when eﬀort is strictly positive, a = log(s), where s ≡ (uh + βωh − ul − βωl).
The optimization problem then becomes
max
s,uh,ωh
uh + βωh − 1 − log(s)
s.t. 0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq),
ω ≤ ωi ≤ ¯ ωnq.
In this case the solution calls for ui = u(θikα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq) and ωi = ¯ ωnq.
B.2 Approximation of the Value Function
For every j ∈ J, we deﬁne a coarse grid Zj = {ωjz}
nω
z=1 over the interval [ω, ¯ ωj].
We also deﬁne an initial guess for the value function: v0j : Zj → ℜ+. For all other
ω ∈ [ω, ¯ ωj], the guess is approximated by a cubic spline which we denote as v0j(ω).
We impose that v0j(ω) is decreasing and concave in ω for all j ∈ J and that the
function is increasing and concave in capital. Then, for all z and every j,q ∈ J such
that θlkα




)[θhkα − c(uh) + βvnq(ωh)] + e−a∗
[θlkα − c(ul) + βvnq(ωl)]
+ kj(1 − δ) − kq, (27)
s.t. (1 − e−a∗
)[uh + βωh] + e−a∗
[ul + βωl] − a∗ = ωjz,
a∗ = argmax (1 − e−a)[uh + βωh] + e−a[ul + βωl] − a,
0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq) ∀ i = h,l,
a∗ ≥ 0,




The operator deﬁned by (27)–(28) generates a sequence Vn ≡ {vnj}j∈J. Our
approximation of the value function on the grid will be Vm such that ||Vm−Vm−1||∞ <









[θhkα − c(uh) + βvnq(ωh)] +
1
s
[θlkα − c(ul) + βvnq(ωl)]
+ kj(1 − δ) − kq,
s.t. ωh = [ωjz + 1 + log(s) − uh]/β,
ωl = [ωjz + 1 + log(s) − s − ul]/β,
0 ≤ ui ≤ u(θikα
j + kj(1 − δ) − kq) ∀ i = h,l,
ω ≤ ωi ≤ ¯ ωq ∀ i = h,l.
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